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Abstract 
Better forecasts of decisions in conflict situations, such as occur in business, politics, and war, 
can help protagonists achieve better outcomes. It is common advice to “stand in the other 
person’s shoes” when involved in a conflict, a procedure we refer to as “role thinking.” We tested 
this advice in order to assess the extent to which it can improve accuracy. Improvement in 
accuracy is important because prior research found that unaided judgment produced forecasts that 
were little better than guessing. We obtained 101 role-thinking forecasts from 27 Naval 
postgraduate students (experts) and 107 role-thinking forecasts from 103 second-year 
organizational behavior students (novices) of the decisions that would be made in nine diverse 
conflicts. The accuracy of the forecasts from the novices was 33% and of those from the experts 
31%. The accuracy of the role-thinking forecasts was little different from chance, which was 
28%. In contrast, when we asked groups of participants to each act as if they were in the shoes 
one of the protagonists, accuracy was 60%.  
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Introduction 
 
We examined the problem of predicting the decisions people will make in important and novel 
conflict situations such as occur in politics, war, business, and personal affairs. To date, neither 
statistical nor casual models have been found to be feasible for such situations and so decision 
makers must rely on judgmental methods. We investigated an approach to improving judgmental 
forecasting for conflicts by deriving forecasts from experts’ analysis of information about the 
roles of the protagonists. 
 
Conflict situations are often complex because they involve interactions between two or more 
parties with divergent interests. The complexity of conflicts provides fertile ground for hindsight 
bias. In retrospect, experts delight in claiming that the proper decisions in conflict situations were 
obvious and that the decisions that were actually made were absurd.  
 
One possible reason for decisions that appear absurd in retrospect is that people involved in 
conflicts fail to properly consider the viewpoint of other protagonists. Robert McNamara, head of 
the U.S. Department of Defense during much of the Viet Nam war, drew this conclusion in the 
documentary, The Fog of War (Morris 2003). One of the lessons he said he had learned was that 
he should have put himself in the shoes of the enemy. This is the common-sense advice typically 
given to people who deal with conflict situations, and people often tell us that this is what they 
do.  
 
We were unable to find prior research on the predictive value of instructing people to “put 
yourself in the shoes” of other protagonists in a conflict situation. Our primary hypothesis was 
that following that injunction in a structured manner should improve the ability of people to 
predict the decisions made by parties in conflict situations. We expected that those with more 
expertise in conflicts would be better able to use the information about roles. However, we had 
reservations over the extent of any improvement in forecasting accuracy due to the difficulty 
individuals might have in thinking through the interactions of a novel conflict.  
 
We also hypothesized that information about roles is vital and that it would be more realistic—
and thus more effective—to utilize this information by asking subjects to adopt a role and then to 
interact with those who adopted the roles of the other protagonists. 
 
 
Difficulty of predicting decisions in conflict situations 
 
The most common approach to forecasting decisions in conflict situations is to use unaided 
judgment. By unaided, we use the narrow definition of judgmental procedures unaided by 
established forecasting principles. This definition does not preclude drawing upon knowledge 
about the situation and discussions with other experts. 
 
Our earlier research used nine conflict situations to assess the accuracy of forecasts from unaided 
judgment. The situations are briefly described in Table 1. Research participants were provided 
with one-to-two page descriptions. Descriptions of two of the conflicts were developed as the 
situations unfolded (55% Pay Plan and Nurses Dispute). The other seven conflict situations were 
obscure and unlikely to be recognized or were disguised to prevent participants from recognizing 
them. We excluded from our analysis the few responses in which the participant recognized the 
actual situation. 
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Table 1: Descriptions of conflict situations 
 
Artists Protest:  Members of a rich nation’s artists’ union occupied a major gallery and 
demanded generous financial support from their government. What will be the 
final resolution of the artists’ sit-in? 
Distribution Channel: An appliance manufacturer proposed to a supermarket chain a novel 
arrangement for retailing their wares. Will the management of the supermarket 
chain agree to the plan? 
55% Pay Plan:  Professional sports players demanded a 55 percent share of gross revenues and 
threatened to go on strike if the owners didn’t concede. Will there be a strike 
and, if so, how long will it last? 
Journal Negotiations: Editors have asked their journal’s publisher for better terms and have received 
an unfavorable response. What agreement do the parties come to? 
Nurses Dispute:  Angry nurses increased their pay demand and threatened more strike action after 
specialist nurses and junior doctors received big increases. What will the 
outcome of their negotiations be? 
Personal Grievance:  An employee demanded a meeting with a mediator when her job was down-
graded after an evaluation by her new manager. What will the outcome of the 
meeting with the mediator be? 
Telco Takeover:  An acquisitive telecommunications provider, after rejecting an offer to buy the 
mobile business of another, made a hostile bid for the whole corporation. How 
will the stand-off between the companies be resolved? 
Water Dispute:  Troops from neighboring nations moved to their common border and the 
downstream nation threatened to bomb a new upstream dam. Will the upstream 
neighbor agree to release additional water and, if not, how will the downstream 
nation’s government respond? 
Zenith Investment:  A large manufacturer evaluated an investment in expensive new technology in 
the face of political pressure. How many new manufacturing plants will the 
corporation decide to commission? 
 
Unaided judgment was little better than chance as a forecasting method. Table 2 presents the 
findings. When the “Journal Negotiations” situation is excluded from the analysis, 29% of the 
novices’ forecasts were accurate.  
 
             Table 2:Accuracy of unaided judgment forecasts vs. chance 
 
  Unaided  
Judgment* 
Situation Chance Novices Experts 
Distribution Plan 33 5 (42) 38 (17) 
Artists Protest 17 5 (39) 10 (20) 
55% Pay Plan 25 27 (15) 18 (11) 
Telco Takeover 25 10 (10) 0 (8) 
Journal Negotiations 25 12 (25) - - 
Personal Grievance 25 44 (9) 31 (13) 
Zenith Investment 33 29 (21) 36 (14) 
Water Dispute 33 45 (11) 50 (8) 
Nurses Dispute 33 68 (22) 73 (15)
Averages (unweighted) 28 27 (194) 32 (106) 
*Green and Armstrong (2007); Armstrong (2001) for Journal Negotiations 
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Role thinking method 
 
Participants were provided with descriptions of the situation and the roles of all protagonists for 
each of the above nine situations. The number of roles for each conflict varied between two and 
ten.  
 
Participants were led through the role-thinking procedure by a questionnaire that we devised for 
the purpose (Appendix A). The questionnaires started with a briefing for participants that stated: 
“A person’s role can make a big difference to how he or she views a situation, so it can be 
difficult to predict what decisions will be made when people interact with each other. In the 
following table, please indicate which decision you think each party in the situation just described 
would prefer to be made and assess how likely it is that each party’s preferred decision will 
actually occur.” 
 
Each questionnaire included a list of between three and six decisions that might plausibly have 
been made in the conflict situation. For example, in the case of the Nurses Dispute, research 
participants were asked to choose between (a) nurses’ demand for an immediate 7% pay rise and 
a 1-year term were substantially or entirely met, (b) management’s offer of a 5% pay rise and a 2-
year term were substantially or entirely accepted, or (c) a compromise was reached. 
 
The questionnaire prompted participants to nominate which of the decisions each party in the 
conflict would prefer and why, how the party would go about trying to achieve the preferred 
decision, and the chances out of 10 that the party’s preferred decision would be made. Finally the 
questionnaire asked participants, having completed their analysis, to pick which of the decisions 
was most likely and why it might and might not occur. The process was intended to encourage 
participants to think hard about how the roles of the protagonists would affect their preferences 
and decisions. 
 
There were two role-thinking sessions. Participants in the role-thinking session at Victoria 
University in Wellington, New Zealand, in April 2005, were 103 students who were enrolled in a 
second-year organizational behavior course. The students were mostly about twenty years of age. 
We asked them to rate their specialist experience in conflict management and their experience 
with conflicts similar to the conflict they were given. The median of the OB students’ responses 
to these questions, using a zero-to-10-scale, was zero for both questions. We refer to these 
participants as “novices.” 
 
Participants in the role-thinking session at the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, CA, in 
May 2005 were 27 naval postgraduate students. Their ages were between 27 and 35. The median 
of their self-assessed specialist conflict management experience ratings was 4 out of 10 and for 
experience with similar conflicts was 1 out of 10. We refer to the naval postgraduate students as 
“experts.” 
 
 
Findings from role thinking experiments 
 
We obtained 107 role-thinking forecasts from the novice participants for eight conflict situations 
and 101 forecasts from the expert participants for nine conflict situations. The unweighted 
average accuracy of the experts’ forecasts was 31% (Table 3). When forecasts for the one conflict 
for which novice forecasts are not also available are excluded (Personal Grievance) 30% of the 
experts’ role-thinking forecasts were accurate. These results differed little from guessing and, 
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contrary to our expectations, the experts using the role thinking procedure did slightly worse (at 
31%, Table 3) than experts using their unaided judgment (32%, Table 2).  
 
Table 3 
Accuracy of role thinking forecasts vs. chance 
 
  Role  
thinking 
Situation Chance Novices Experts 
Distribution Plan 33 0 (14) 0 (13) 
Artists Protest 17 8 (13) 0 (12) 
55% Pay Plan 25 13 (12) 8 (13) 
Telco Takeover 25 13 (16) 18 (11) 
Journal Negotiations 25 25 (12) 30 (10) 
Personal Grievance 25 - - 36 (11) 
Zenith Investment 33 46 (13) 55 (11) 
Water Dispute 33 75 (16) 56 (9) 
Nurses Dispute 33 82 (11) 73 (11)
Averages (unweighted) 28 33 (107) 31 (101) 
 
Our role-thinking analysis in Table 3 is on the basis of the broad distinction between the expertise 
of undergraduate students (novices) and that of mature graduate students (experts). That analysis 
takes no account of differences in specialist conflict management experience or of experience 
with similar conflicts or of the time the participants spent on their analysis. We reasoned that 
participants who had more of such relevant and direct experience should be better able to use the 
information we provided and that participants who spent more time on the analysis would also 
make better use of the information.  
 
We next analyzed all the role-thinking responses (novices and experts combined) using 
participants’ answers to questions about their experience and the time they spent on the task. 
 
The role-thinking forecasts of those with some experience as conflict management specialists 
were only a little better at 33% accurate than the forecasts of those with no experience at 31% 
accurate. Experience with conflicts similar to the one being analyzed did help, however; the 
forecasts of participants with such experience were more accurate than the forecasts of those with 
no such experience at 38% accurate compared to 29%.   
 
Spending more time on the role-thinking task was associated with forecasts that were somewhat 
more accurate; the forecasts derived from analyses of 25 minutes or more were somewhat more 
accurate at 35% than the 31% accurate forecasts from briefer analyses.  
 
The findings on the effects of experience and time spent are only suggestive given that the sample 
sizes for the subgroups were small and the number of situations modest. 
 
 
Comparison with forecasts from groups in simulated interaction 
 
Armstrong (2001) and Green (2005) reported findings on using groups of people to simulate the 
roles and interactions of people involved in conflict situations, a method called “simulated 
interaction.” Participants in the simulated interaction experiments were given information only on 
their own role. Otherwise they received the same information as participants in the role-thinking 
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and unaided-judgment treatments but, instead of analyzing the information they were given on 
their own, they participated in improvised interactions with people playing the roles of the other 
protagonists in a conflict. We expected simulated interactions to provide more realistic 
representations of the situations. 
 
Note that we are here comparing group versus individual forecasts. However, given that unaided-
judgment and role-thinking forecast accuracy differed little from guessing, combining the 
individual forecasts from those methods would do little to increase accuracy, and so the 
comparison is therefore a fair one. 
 
As shown in Table 4, the simulated-interaction forecasts were accurate for 60% of the 
predictions, which was a substantial improvement over role-thinking accuracy of little more than 
30%. The simulated interaction forecasts were more accurate than the role-thinking forecasts for 
all of the nine conflicts. In addition, when the simulated interaction forecasts were combined 
across the groups (an average of 14 groups simulated each situation) the modal group decision 
was accurate for eight of the nine conflicts, or 89%.  
 
Table 4 
Accuracy of forecasts from simulated interaction by groups vs. chance 
 
  Simulated  
Interaction* 
Situation Chance Novices 
Distribution Plan 33 75 (12) 
Artists Protest 17 29 (14) 
55% Pay Plan 25 60 (10) 
Telco Takeover 25 40 (10) 
Journal Negotiations 25 42 (24) 
Personal Grievance 25 60 (10) 
Zenith Investment 33 59 (17) 
Water Dispute 33 90 (10) 
Nurses Dispute 33 82 (22)
Averages (unweighted) 28 60 (129) 
 
*Green (2005); Armstrong (2001) for Journal Negotiations 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Our hypothesis that role thinking would improve forecast accuracy received little support, 
probably because participants could not think through the complexities of the interactions. 
Nevertheless, the idea expressed in the injunction to put oneself in the other person’s shoes is 
valid: the roles that people have are vital to their decisions. When participants were each assigned 
the role of a protagonist and were asked to simulate the interactions between them, their decisions 
were accurate for eight out of the nine conflicts for which we obtained forecasts.  
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Appendix A: Role thinking questionnaire 
 
International Water Dispute 
 
1) A person’s role can make a big difference to how he or she views a situation, so it can be difficult to predict 
what decisions will be made when people interact with each other. In the following table, please indicate 
which decision you think each party in the situation just described would prefer to be made and assess how 
likely it is that each party’s preferred decision will actually occur. 
 
 For each party in the conflict, please use your judgment to: 
(A)  (i) select from the following list the decision or decisions the party would prefer to see emerge from  
  today’s meeting:  
    a. Midistan has decided to release additional water in order to meet the needs of the Deltalandish people 
    b. Deltaland has ordered the bombing of the dam at Mididam to release water for the needy Deltalandish people
  c. Deltaland has declared war on Midistan  
        (ii) explain why you think the party prefers that decision or those decisions 
  (B) (i)  explain how you think the party would go about trying to achieve its most-preferred decision  
        (ii) rate the chances that the decision will be made, out of 10 (0 = almost no chance…10 = almost certain)
 
Party  
(A)(i) Party’s preferred decision(s) from a-c, above 
     (ii) Why preferred  
(B)(i) How party would try to achieve most-preferred decision 
     (ii) Chances that most-preferred decision will be made(0-10) 
Midistan (i) [______]  (ii) (i)  
 
 
                                                                    (ii) [___] 
Deltaland (i) [______]  (ii) (i)  
  
 
                                                                    (ii) [___] 
Concordia (i) [______]  (ii) (i)  
 
 
                                                                    (ii) [___] 
 
2) Given your analysis in Q1, which of the decisions listed in (A)(i) above is most likely?  [____] a-c 
3)  Why will that (Q2) decision occur, and why might it not occur?  
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